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Nineteenth-century theories of organic evolution exerted a powerful 
impact upon American social thought during the years between Appo-
mattox and the Great Depression. For the two generations of post-Jack-
sonian educated Americans who experienced the disorder of sectional 
conflict and industrialization, the precepts of Spencerian and Darwinian 
evolutionary biology suggested the reassuring lesson that, for all the ap-
parent chaos of human society, it was in fact as rigidly governed by 
predictable natural laws as was the world of nature. They looked to the 
laws of evolution to provide comfort in the present and guidance for the 
future, rather than to the traditional religious verities and the stable 
village order which had sustained their fathers. But evolutionary science 
did more than fill a need: it also colored discussions of man, his behavior 
and his milieu, in many specific areas of thought. At least since the Great 
Depression, however, the penchant for using explicit models and anal-
ogies from the evolutionary natural sciences in social explanation and 
theorization has largely disappeared from American life. 
At its peak the influence of evolutionary natural science was nowhere 
more deep and profound in American social thought than in the late 
nineteenth-century social sciences. The pioneers of our modern social 
sciences contributed the most elaborate evolutionary social theories, and 
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they were probably more directly responsible than any other group of 
thinkers or publicists in America for the dissemination of evolutionary 
catchwords, slogans and schemes. Thus, when we seek clues for the dis-
appearance of the explicit evolutionary analogy from social theory, it is 
to the history of the social sciences, and to sociology in particular, that 
we turn. 
The present essay is an exploration of the reasons why social theory 
based on explicit models, analogies, and determinants of the evolutionary 
natural sciences was abandoned in American sociology between 1890 and 
1920. The central thesis we shall argue here is that the academic profes-
sionalization of American sociology had a wholly unanticipated impact 
upon the intellectual history of the discipline, that is, upon its conceptual 
horizons and level of discourse. Academic professionalization eventually 
forced those American sociologists who identified with professionalization 
to abandon the practice of basing social theorization and explanation on 
explicit analogies drawn from the evolutionary natural sciences; it grad-
ually made them realize that they could not use the determinants, meta-
phors and models suggested by biology and psychology. When considered 
within the context of the disciplinary specialization that was becoming so 
pervasive in the emerging American university system, professionaliza-
tion eventually forced academic sociologists to make their nascent disci-
pline fully autonomous, with its own assumptions, methods, concepts and 
body of data. Disciplinary autonomy and specialization dictated the ex-
planation of social phenomena on their own terms, not with the assump-
tions and analogies of the evolutionary natural sciences. American 
sociologists could not readily grasp, in all its implications, the insight 
that social structure influences human behavior—perhaps the distinctive 
contribution of the discipline of sociology in the twentieth century—until 
they had realized that culture could not be reduced to nature, that social 
phenomena had to be studied on their own terms and not with the per-
spectives, assumptions, analogies and determinants of disciplines which 
had as their focus of attention organic rather than superorganic phe-
nomena. 
A qualification should be made before proceeding further. In the 
post-1920 "professional" era, American sociologists have often used an 
implicitly or explicitly "neo-evolutionary" perspective. The examples of 
John Dewey and Luther Lee Bernard in stressing the conditioning of 
original nature by social environment, of Charles A. Ellwood and Wil-
liam F. Ogburn in postulating the existence of social trends within larger 
patterns of cultural evolution, or, more recently, of Talcott Parsons and 
other "functionalists" in drawing attention to the development of the 
"social system," all spring to mind. However, the advocates of such "neo-
evolutionary" perspectives (if these perspectives can be called "neo-evolu-
tionary" in any meaningful way) have differed from their pre-1920 prede-
cessors in several important ways. They have consistently recognized and 
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understood the distinction between the biological and the cultural levels 
of existence, thus avoiding the practice, common before the late 1910's, of 
explaining cultural and social phenomena with explicitly evolutionary 
models and determinants drawn directly from the natural sciences. Also, 
they have accepted the notion of a qualitative difference between human 
and animal behavior, so far as social explanation is concerned. Here, for 
example, is how William F. Ogburn defined "social evolution" in the 
1940's: 
We consider social evolution as not including, at least in 
the past several thousand years, any biological evolution. 
What is evolving then is society or the various social group-
ings such as government, and industry, and the state . . . . 
What is evolving is 'culture,' that is to say, the environment 
which men have, but which the wild animals do not have. 
This culture, or our social heritage, is a composite of many 
different parts, such as cities, families, farms, philosophies, 
art, science, etc.1 
Professionalization is a complex term with many shades of meaning. 
Historians of American science have used it to refer to a variety of dis-
similar events, such as the exclusion of the clergy from the scientific 
community in the eighteenth century, or the emergence of disciplines, 
journals, scientific societies, and a more or less autonomous scientific 
community in the early nineteenth century.2 Such phenomena are not 
defined here as academic professionalization. The term here refers to the 
sequence of events after 1880 in the history of higher education, science 
and scholarship in the United States when the university was replacing 
the college as the dynamic center of American higher education, when 
the university was becoming the chief institutional identification for the 
practitioners of the formal disciplines of knowledge, when scientists and 
scholars with university affiliations (or with ambitions for university 
affiliations) busily engaged themselves in establishing their disciplines 
within the university by founding departments and graduate programs 
and outside it by creating national professional associations and journals 
on disciplinary lines with the consequent articulation of nationally recog-
nized professional standards of performance.3 
There were two distinct phases of the academic professionalization of 
American sociology. The first was institutional. It was the direct result 
of both the quickening of public interest in social problems and the rapid 
expansion of universities and colleges after 1880. Starting in the 1870's, 
institutions of higher learning began offering courses in "Social Science," 
which might mean social problems, economics, or the philosophy of his-
tory; or, apparently less commonly, courses in "Political Economy" based 
on Herbert Spencer's cosmic evolutionary social science. By the 1890's the 
"Social Science" courses began to give way to courses in "sociology," al-
though it was not until after 1900 that there was a commonly recognized 
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distinction between them. The rapid expansion of college courses in 
"sociology" in the 1890's (between 1889 and 1900 ninety-seven colleges 
and universities introduced courses in "sociology"), the founding of the 
first academic department of sociology at the University of Chicago in 
1893, the launching of the first journal of the new discipline, The Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, by the Chicago department in 1895 and the 
establishment of promising graduate programs in the new discipline at 
both Chicago and Columbia University, all suggest that institutional 
professionalization was well under way by the end of the 1890's. After 
1900 institutional professionalization quickened its pace, but it did not 
change its character, as appointments in sociology were made at major 
universities, as the number of Ph.D. graduates rapidly grew, and as a 
national professional association, the American Sociological Society, 
emerged to serve the purposes of disciplinary and professional commu-
nication.4 
The second phase of the academic professionalization of American 
sociology was intellectual and methodological, a direct consequence of 
institutional professionalization. Within the context of disciplinary spe-
cialization it was incumbent upon academic sociologists to define their 
discipline, to identify its content, methods and assumptions, and to differ-
entiate it from other disciplines. This was a difficult task. A body of 
sociological thinking existed in America before 1900, most conspicuously 
the humanitarian-reformist Social Science and the evolutionary Spen-
cerian traditions. But there was no commonly agreed upon definition of 
the subject matter, basic assumptions, concepts and methods of sociology. 
So, while it might be said that there were some American "sociologists" 
before the 1890's, generally speaking they did little to establish an im-
personal discipline which could be used by later generations of practi-
tioners as the basis of further work. As Thomas Kuhn has commented in 
another context, there was no research based on prior achievements that 
could be used as the basis of further practice.5 American "sociologists" 
before 1890 postulated highly personal systems of sociology which re-
flected their own philosophical points of view and which were therefore 
useless to anyone who did not accept the philosophical premises of the 
system in question. The example of Lester Frank Ward, often called the 
"father of American sociology," illustrates the point perfectly. In the 
1880's and 1890's Ward did much to popularize the term sociology, to 
demonstrate its utility for social reform, and to suggest that sociology 
should be "scientific" in approach, spirit and method. But Ward devoted 
most of his efforts in sociology to expounding his own system, which was 
highly personal, almost idiosyncratic, a prodigious and intricate intel-
lectual construct which was both an extension of his particular philo-
sophical premises and a codification of his special definition of sociology 
as the queen of the sciences. As such, Ward's sociology was useless to those 
sociologists who did not share his premises, his outlook, or his sense of 
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dilettantism, as a professional academic sociologist was to remark in the 
1940's: 
. . . Ward worked out his cosmic system which had organ-
ization and range, even if its scope doomed it. . . . few per-
sons would have had the breadth of education which would 
qualify them to handle it. Ward did teach courses ex-
pounding his system at Brown University, but scarcely any-
where else could his lectures be handled. After his death his 
successors at Brown made some attempt to carry on the 
tradition, but within fifteen years it became extinct even 
there.6 
a generation of professionals 
In the 1890's a small cadre of seventeen academic sociologists who 
were the products of institutional professionalization came to the fore. 
They took the lead in promoting intellectual professionalization. In 
many ways they were a transitional generation, prominent between the 
late nineteenth-century amateurs who wrote cosmic schemes of society and 
the post-1920 generation who prided themselves on their quantitative 
methods and fields of specialization. As a group the seventeen were young 
men just embarking on their careers in the 1890's when sociology was 
becoming a university discipline; twelve of them had been born between 
1861 and 1874. As a group they were academic men, trained in a social 
science, most commonly in economics or in history. Fourteen of them 
possessed earned doctorates in a social science or history, ten of the four-
teen having received their doctorates between 1893 and 1902. They had 
academic careers, many of them wrote important textbooks of sociology, 
and all but one were elected President of the American Sociological So-
ciety before the end of the 1920's. But what marked them off even more 
than such simple and obvious criteria was their behavior: they all busied 
themselves with the task of intellectual professionalization, of attempting 
to define the content, the assumptions and the methods of sociology as a 
discipline. 
But the seventeen cannot be depicted as merely a homogenous group 
of academic professionals. Nor is it clear that they were self-conscious 
professionals who fully understood the implications of professionalism. 
In many ways they were a diverse group, each one mixing public and 
professional values in somewhat different proportions. Many of them, 
most conspicuously Edward A. Ross and less notoriously William I. 
Thomas and Charles A. Ellwood, identified with the progressive move-
ment, or at least with a number of progressive reforms; yet William 
Graham Sumner and his disciple Albert Galloway Keller did not, at least 
not publicly. A number of them sprang from Protestant ministerial back-
grounds, and some—Ross and Ellwood for example—embraced liberal 
Protestantism, believing in the existence of evolutionary laws of society 
which the new science of sociology could discover to further the progress 
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of mankind. Yet others, such as Thomas and Sumner in their mature 
years, exhibited wholly secular and empirical outlooks. Some, like Ed-
ward Cary Hayes, Ross and Ellwood, were proud of their Middle Western 
village heritage and sought to sustain it, whereas others, like Thomas and 
Albion W. Small, were quite urban in outlook. Several—Small, Ross and 
Sumner, for example—studied in Germany, respected German social sci-
ence, and wanted to infuse American higher education with what they 
understood to be the spirit of German university scholarship. Yet 
Thomas, Charles H. Cooley and Franklin H. Giddings, who never at-
tended a German university, made conspicuous contributions to both the 
theory and the methods of the new discipline of sociology. 
What unified these men as a group was not so much their personal 
characteristics, values and backgrounds (although there were some simi-
larities to be sure), but the essentially impersonal circumstances in which 
they found themselves as academic professionals. It was professionaliza-
tion—the need to define the new discipline within the university system; 
the obligation to articulate national rather than local or amateur stand-
ards of training and competence; the necessity of differentiating sociology 
from other disciplines, of delineating its methods, assumptions, body of 
data and of creating an impersonal discipline which could be used by any 
practitioner regardless of his personal outlook—which made them into 
something of a cohesive intellectual circle for several years and which gave 
their activities a certain uniformity despite their rather different attitudes 
on many issues, including, at first, their definitions of sociology.7 
In the 1890's some of the seventeen made the first attempts to define 
their discipline according to the standards of a university profession. 
They began by rejecting Herbert Spencer's biological sociology, his anal-
ogy between the biological and social organisms, which had so dominated 
sociological theory to that point. They agreed that social forces were 
psychological and mental in character, that the proper focus of sociolog-
ical theory was the individual, and that society might be defined as the 
mental interactions of individuals. They looked to the new individual 
physiological psychology of the 1890's, most often to William James' in-
stinct theory in The Principles of Psychology (1890), for their basic concep-
tion of man and society. They apparently saw no contradiction between 
borrowing assumptions and analogies from a wholly separate discipline 
and insisting at the same time that sociology was an independent science 
whose practitioners should not depend upon the assumptions, methods, 
data and point of view of other disciplines. In 1894, for example, in one 
of the earliest statements of sociological theory by any of the seventeen, 
An Introduction to the Study of Society, Albion W. Small and George E. 
Vincent declared that society was "a complex of activities and movements 
originated by the energy of those physical and psychic attributes which 
determine human motives." At the same time, however, they insisted that 
the methods and assumptions of the biological sciences were completely 
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inappropriate for the discipline of sociology; sociologists should use his-
torical and analytical methods to study man as he actually was, without 
reference to the viewpoints of the natural sciences. Sociology, they argued, 
was concerned with the thoughts of individuals, and these were "in a very 
large degree, an acquisition from the resources of society. The individual 
believes not merely the results of his own sensations and cognitions, but 
accepts on faith a vast body of social knowledge." Small and Vincent also 
insisted that sociology was a science which only persons formally trained 
in the discipline, and who shared its sense of autonomy from other dis-
ciplines, should practice. Permitting amateurs to study sociology "would 
be like setting an artist in oils to build bridges, or allowing a boiler 
maker to take command of a navy." But that did not prevent them from 
concluding that it ". . . is the psychical potencies of society, knowledge, 
taste, and criteria of conduct, which persist and constitute the real life of 
the social organism."8 
In his well-known text, Columbia sociologist Franklin H. Giddings, 
another of the seventeen, declared in 1896 that sociology should be a 
psychological rather than a biological discipline, for rigid biological anal-
ogies were inappropriate for sociology. "Every distinct science," he ex-
plained, "must have its own classifications and its own names for phe-
nomena which, however they resemble the phenomena studied by other 
sciences, are yet different, and are the subject matter of a separate science 
only because they are different."9 Several years later Giddings argued in 
Science, the widely read journal of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, that sociology would have to work out its own 
distinctive assumptions and methods apart from other disciplines. Soci-
ologists, he insisted, would have to understand that they dealt with phe-
nomena that could not be reduced to mere natural forces. Giddings 
believed that social association, rather than natural forces, had a decisive 
impact "on the natures of individuals, and adapts them to social life. It 
creates a social nature."10 
When American sociologists said that sociology was a psychological 
science, they were generally borrowing the functional instinct psychology 
of James and other physiological psychologists. They ignored psychol-
ogist James Mark Baldwin's careful dissection of the new functional in-
stinct psychology in the late 1890's. Baldwin had argued that the collapse 
of the Neo-Lamarckian principle of heredity implied than man had a 
social as well as a physical inheritance, and, of the two, the social was 
clearly the more important determinant of human behavior. Essentially 
Baldwin anticipated the post-1900 Boasian concept of culture, with its 
profoundly anti-naturalistic implications.11 The seventeen sociologists, 
again, saw no contradiction between depending on the naturalistic as-
sumptions of psychology and asserting that sociology should be auton-
omous from all other sciences. Charles A. Ellwood, for example, wrote 
his doctoral dissertation for Small at Chicago as a defense of the instinct 
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theory as the correct theoretical basis for the new discipline of sociology.12 
Edward A. Ross attacked the old Spencerian biological sociology in his 
famous Social Control (1901). He insisted that society exercised its con-
trol over the individual by informal social means, such as public opinion, 
law, belief, suggestion, education, custom and ceremony, rather than 
biological means. Human differences, he said, had biological causes, 
whereas human uniformities had social causes. He thus segregated social 
phenomena from biological, although not psychological, causes. And he, 
like the other sixteen sociologists, denned sociology as the study of the 
individuals of society rather than of groups, classes and social institutions. 
Yet he believed that sociology should be distinct from all other disciplines. 
Analogies from other sciences have suggested what to look for, he said in 
1905, but it "is certain, however that no recognized science borrows its 
laws from other departments of knowledge. The lasting possession of 
sociology will be regularities which, instead of being imported from with-
out, have been discovered by patiently comparing social facts among 
themselves/'13 Ross argued that sociology had to move from detecting 
vague and superficial analogies among a small number of facts to discover-
ing large numbers of social facts that could be explained on their own 
terms. Yet, almost in the same breath, he declared that sociology was a 
psychical science, and that no ultimate non-psychic factors—factors that is, 
derived from the social order—could be admitted until it was shown how 
they affected individual motive and choice.14 
In 1902, another of the seventeen sociologists, Charles H. Cooley, 
blended individualistic instinct psychology and sociology. Organic evo-
lution had established human nature, he explained, but while man had 
an original endowment of innate instincts and other tendencies, his na-
ture and personality could only develop in a social environment. What-
ever original nature man had was "very vague and incapable to [sic] 
producing definite phenomena without the aid of experience." Man was 
a part of society, and sociologists had to study the thoughts and motives 
of people, which could be properly understood only in the social context 
that allowed them to develop. All original human nature really provided, 
declared Cooley, was the capacity to think and act. He saw no tension 
between this statement, which was a logical consequence of professional-
ization, and his affirmation that sociology was a psychological discipline.15 
Three of the seventeen sociologists, Small, William I. Thomas and 
Frank W. Blackmar, argued in various important statements published 
before 1907 that social phenomena were entirely distinct from biological 
phenomena, that sociology in consequence had to be an autonomous dis-
cipline, and that because human nature was in large measure innate, 
sociology was a psychological discipline.16 In his presidential address be-
fore the newly formed American Sociological Society in 1906, for example, 
Small declared that we "agree to differentiate sociology from antecedent 
psychology or cosmology or metaphysics," but he still believed that while 
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sociology should be a distinct science, sociologists might learn some things 
from natural scientists. However, when Small said that sociologists stud-
ied human social relations, an order of phenomena that natural scientists 
were unqualified to examine, he had come close to following the profes-
sionalization impulse to its logical conclusion.17 
After 1906, as the seventeen sociologists discussed the boundaries of 
their new discipline, there were unmistakable signs that some of them 
were beginning to recognize the contradiction between insisting that soci-
ology was an autonomous science with its own order of phenomena to 
account for and their continued reliance upon naturalistic analogies 
borrowed from another discipline, psychology. In Folkways (1906), for 
example, William Graham Sumner offered an explanation of society 
without any biological or psychological metaphors, an explanation which 
concentrated on superorganic group behavior.18 In Social Psychology 
(1908) Ross paid the customary homage to psychology by invoking the 
instinct theory as an explanation for much human behavior, but he forth-
rightly conceded that the sociologist was chiefly interested in the inter-
action of human minds which occurred only in a social environment.19 
the shift to the group 
Cooley made the first decisive break from the metaphors of naturalistic 
psychology in his Social Organization (1909). He shifted the focus of 
attention of sociologists from the individual to the social group. He in-
sisted that human nature could only develop in face-to-face primary social 
groups like the family, the playground and the nursery, which meant that, 
for Cooley, human nature was something more than mere instinct and 
something less than formal institutions. Human nature Cooley defined 
as a group nature which developed after birth in association with other 
humans, and which athropied in social isolation. As Cooley followed 
professionalization to its logical conclusion and insisted that man's be-
havior should be explained on social and cultural grounds, he had come 
very close indeed to recognizing that it was not necessary for sociologists 
to depend upon psychologists for their basic assumptions.20 In 1909, 
Edward Cary Hayes, another of the seventeen, made the semantic and 
conceptual break when he declared in the American Journal of Sociology 
that sociology and psychology were wholly independent sciences whose 
practitioners studied entirely different orders of phenomena, neither of 
which could be explained in terms of the other.21 George Herbert Mead, 
a brilliant philosopher and psychologist at the University of Chicago, in-
formed the seventeen sociologists in several articles that there was a 
qualitative difference between animal and human intelligence, that social 
psychologists and sociologists studied an entirely different order of phe-
nomena than did the physiological psychologists, and that social behavior 
—the proper concern of sociology—had social rather than psychological, 
physiological or natural determinants.22 William I. Thomas, one of the 
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seventeen sociologists, and a colleague of Mead's, argued in 1909 in a 
famous compendium that the social sciences could learn more from each 
other about human behavior than they could from the natural scientists. 
Thomas specifically recommended the work of the Boas circle in cultural 
anthropology.23 
After 1911 the movement away from dependence on psychology was 
especially clear among the young men who had taken their Ph.D.'s with 
the seventeen sociologists after 1900. They were more attuned than their 
elders to the values and outlook of the new university professions, espe-
cially to the strictures for empirical research into concrete phenomena. 
In the 1910's this younger generation began to emerge within the profes-
sion of sociology, to take their Ph.D.'s, start their university careers, and 
to engage in the research and publication that would bring them pro-
fessional reputations. The example of one of these younger sociologists, 
Luther Lee Bernard, illustrates the point nicely. Bernard started his 
doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago in 1910 on the heredi-
tary determinants of anti-social conduct. As his graduate professors had 
told him to read all the literature on heredity and instinct carefully 
before turning to original research—a characteristic admonition in the 
new university graduate programs—he did. He found no satisfactory 
definition of mental heredity and no scientific system of classification of 
human instincts. Consequently, he simply gave up on the concept of 
original human nature, deciding such determinants of the natural sci-
ences as mental heredity and instinct were both unscientific and inappro-
priate for the social scientist. Subsequently Bernard became one of the 
most celebrated critics of the instinct theory, and at every point he advo-
cated the divorce of sociological theory from the conceptions of the 
natural sciences.24 By 1923 Bernard could look back at the results of the 
professionalization impulse in sociology and say that 
Sociology is at last shaking itself free from biological domi-
nance and is developing an objective and a method of its 
own. Thus it promises to be a science, not merely a poorly 
organized and presumptuous branch of biology, as some 
biologists formerly seemed to regard it.25 
But some of the older men, the seventeen sociologists, also made an 
accommodation with the professionalization impulse. Charles A. Ell-
wood, who taught sociology at the University of Missouri for three dec-
ades, devoted most of his academic career to espousing various social 
reforms and to writing treatises defining the boundaries of sociological 
theory. At first, Ellwood, who regularly taught Sunday school and who 
was a liberal Protestant, tried to fashion social theory on evolutionary 
patterns. In such books as Sociology and Modern Problems (1910), Soci-
ology in its Psychological Aspects (1912) and in several essays published 
before 1914, Ellwood embraced two contradictory assumptions, the idea 
that human nature was innate as the functional psychologists said it was, 
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and the concept that sociology was a distinct and independent science 
with its own data and assumptions. There was a close correlation be-
tween his liberal Protestant theology and his teleological conception of 
the social order. For Ellwood, purpose existed in nature and in society; 
God had implanted certain innate traits and impulses in man for His 
purposes. Indeed Ellwood was so much a naturalist that for a few years 
he even lent support to the eugenics movement.26 But a sabattical year 
(1914-15) studying under R. R. Marett in England exposed him to cul-
tural anthropology. The experience made him realize that cultural and 
social phenomena operated autonomously from natural forces, and that 
sociology could never be a science unless sociologists divested themselves 
of the concepts, assumptions, methods and analogies of the natural sci-
ences. Ellwood returned from England determined to write another 
treatise in sociological theory from the cultural rather than the psycho-
logical or naturalistic point of view.27 In 1915 he favorably reviewed 
bacteriologist H. W. Conn's blistering attack on eugenics, a fact of 
some importance, as Conn had argued that social phenomena had 
social rather than natural causes.28 In 1916 Ellwood wrote that Gobi-
neau's famous book on race had only "historical value, and as such it may 
possibly fill a useful place in our libraries."29 In 1917, he published his 
new theoretical statement, Introduction to Social Psychology. There he 
examined social phenomena from a cultural rather than a psychological 
or naturalistic point of view. He still viewed society in evolutionary 
terms, as a progressive and unilinear development toward perfection, 
probably because of his profound religious commitments, and he refused 
to shift from the individual to the group, becoming a strident opponent 
of statistical methods in the late 1920's.30 But from 1915 on Ellwood 
insisted that cultural phenomena could not be reduced to natural causes 
if sociology was to be a reputable science.31 In the late 1910's he roundly 
criticized that sociology which was based on the assumptions of the nat-
ural sciences. He became aware of the work of Boas and his students in 
cultural anthropology, as did sociologists after 1916, and he now accepted 
Baldwin's concept of social heredity, as well as its intellectual first cousin, 
the Boasian idea of culture.32 In 1919 he wrote in a major psychology 
journal that the "assumption that the mores, institutions and adult be-
havior of a civilized group can be explained through 'instinct' is open to 
grave doubt."33 In the 1920's he worked out a reasonably consistent 
sociological theory based on the assumption of social rather than natural 
causation.34 
Several of the other seventeen sociologists made a similar shift. As 
early as 1915, for example, Edward Cary Hayes insisted that cultural and 
social phenomena were the primary determinants of human behavior 
and that social scientists should stop looking to the natural sciences for 
the laws of human behavior.35 In Social Process (1918) Charles Horton 
Cooley analyzed society without recourse to evolutionary conceptions or 
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the determinants of the natural sciences.36 Probably the most profound 
transformation was made by William I. Thomas. Thomas had read 
deeply and widely in cultural anthropology since the early 1900's, and 
Boasian cultural anthropology had gradually made him realize that social 
scientists could not look to the natural sciences for the laws of human 
behavior if social scientists were to become professional scientists with an 
autonomous discipline. By 1918, when Thomas and the Polish sociologist 
Florian Znanecki published their five volume monograph, The Polish 
Peasant in Europe and America, Thomas had fully understood the impli-
cations of professionalization for sociological theory and method. He 
argued in the long methodological note which introduced the monograph 
that social investigation had to be based solely on facts rather than values, 
and that social facts had to be interpreted on their own terms, not in the 
way that physical and natural scientists interpreted their phenomena. 
Only experts trained in proper sociological methods could properly 
appreciate the complexity of social facts.37 
Furthermore, some psychologists declared in the late 1910's that cul-
tural phenomena could not be reduced to natural phenomena. In 1917, 
Robert H. Gault, a psychologist who specialized in criminology and who 
had been a eugenist and a believer in the instinct theory, took note of 
behaviorist John B. Watson's experiments on instincts in humans; Gault 
declared that "there are but few instincts, properly speaking, and . . . 
these are less specific than generalized."38 In his presidential address 
before the American Psychological Association in December, 1916, John 
Dewey called for the emancipation of social psychology and sociology 
from the narrow and deforming emphasis of individual physiological 
psychology, for the reconstitution of the social sciences on the basis of 
research into the specific social interaction among humans and to the 
details of group behavior. The human mind and personality, he argued, 
could only develop in a specific social situation, and it was that social 
situation that was the proper focus of attention for the social scientist.39 
By the early 1920's the professionalization impulse had run its course 
and had exercised a decisive impact upon American sociological theory. 
The new generation of empirical sociologists, such as Luther Lee Bernard, 
Robert E. Park and Ellsworth Faris had come of age within the profes-
sion and had, by insisting on the autonomy of social from natural phe-
nomena, effected a transformation in sociological theory, moving it from 
grand evolutionary and naturalistic models and concern with issues of 
public policy, to cultural determinism, a commitment to specific em-
pirical research and investigation of discrete areas of specialization.40 As 
Luther Lee Bernard noted in the late 1920's, in the last decade or so 
sociologists had abandoned the early twentieth-century philosophical and 
theoretical approach for a more dispassionate factual one, in which 
statistical and case study methods were used. In an obvious reference to 
the older generation of sociologists, Bernard remarked that there "are 
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still some belated attempts in sociology to take seriously the making of 
concepts and of social laws, but most sociologists are now persuaded that 
if they get the facts the concepts and the laws will take care of them-
selves."41 In 1924, Albion W. Small recognized the changes that had 
swept over American sociology in the past three decades. Remarking on 
the tendency of the early twentieth-century sociologists to rely upon 
theoretical statements rather than to bother themselves with hard em-
pirical research into concrete social phenomena, Small concluded that "a 
humiliating proportion of the so-called 'sociology' of the last thirty years 
in America, both inside and outside of the goodly fellowship of scholars 
who were self-disciplining themselves and one another into the character 
of scientific specialists, has been simply old-fashioned opinionativeness 
under a new-fangled name."42 "The true story of the American socio-
logical movement," Small concluded, "would be a treatment of the 
theme: Up from Amateurism."43 What Small said was true enough, 
when considered in its proper historical context. But it was also true that 
the professionalization of American sociology had done much, quite in-
advertently, to destroy the explicitly evolutionary schemes of late nine-
teenth-century social thinkers. 
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